Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Max Black on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
I 58 Meaning/Grice: according to Grice there is a meaning only by the effect on the listener. - We have not only to discover the primary speaker's intention, but the listener should also think of something specific and intend it. BlackVs: this is not sufficient and not necessary: it does not have to be true, even though the conditions are met, and may be true although they are not met. I 77 The background can not be understood if the core ("it's snowing") is not understood. Meaning/BlackVsGrice: Black thesis: it is not the detecting of the speaker's intention what causes an effect on the listener, allowing the hearer to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of the speaker meaning allows the listener to infer the speaker's intention. >Speaker's meaning, >Intentions, >Understanding. Intention/Black: surely there could be no understanding without primitive situations in which a speaker's intention is recognized. - But that is no proof of the correctness of an intentionalist analysis. - - - II 58 Meaning/Black: Meaning must be located beyond language for words to ever have a practical application. - E.g., Determine whether there is a color. - Differences between objects in the world are recognized along the scale of our language categories. >Classification, >Categories. II 98 Meaning/Black: the "life of the words " is not in any "mental circumstances", but rather in the ability to interact with symbolic actions in relationship and for it to serve as a starting point. - Meaning can not be fixed to any feature of mental actions. Brain-o-scope/Black: if we had such an instrument there would still remain the task of interpreting the images. >Interpretation. II 211 Meaning/Putnam/Black: Meaning cannot be the object; e.g. "Titanic" would have no meaning any more. >Reference, >Non-existence. Meaning need not be "in me" to be mine. - (( s)> Putnam:"meanings ain't in the head"). >Meaning/Putnam._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28